2010년 8월 13일 금요일

[2010-08-12] 강력한 사바시아

 

 

 

Kearns' solo blast

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Granderson's RBI single

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter's stellar defense

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Teixeira's sacrifice fly

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CC's solid outing

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[2010-08-12] 땅볼 타점

 

 

 

A-Rod's RBI groundout

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[2010-08-11] 클러치 템즈

 

 

 

Thames' solo shot

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thames' go-ahead single

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter's game-tying single

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rivera shuts the door

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mo saves it

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swisher turns two

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Berkman's RBI double

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Must C: Clutch

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Runners advance on wild pitch

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Yankees turn two

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter passes Ott on hits list

 

 

 

 

 

 

[2010-08-11] 동점 더블

 

 

 

A-Rod's RBI double

 

 

 

 

 

 

2010년 8월 10일 화요일

[2010/08/09] 티렉 26호

 

 

 

Jeter's nice play

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thames' two-bagger

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swisher's sliding grab

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kearns' sliding grab

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Teixeira's solo shot

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pena's diving stop

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter steals second

 

 

 

 

 

 

2010년 8월 9일 월요일

[2010/08/08] 모슬리 역투 속에 낙승

 

 

 

Berkman hits a double

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moseley fields a comebacker

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swisher's catch at the wall

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swisher's sliding snag

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gardner's run-scoring hit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter's two-run double

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Berkman's RBI double

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Yanks turn two

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Teixeira's solo blast

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moseley shuts down the Sox

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moseley's barehanded gem

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Berkman goes 3-for-4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cash's error leads to a run

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jeter passes Ruth on hits list

 

 

 

 

 

 

[2010/08/08] 롸드 역대 세번째 600-300 클럽

 

 

 

A-Rod's 300th steal

 

 

 

 

 

 

Morrow's masterpiece bettered only by Halladay in Year of Pitcher

Morrow's masterpiece bettered only by Halladay in Year of Pitcher

 

Blue Jays starter Brandon Morrow may have lost his no-hitter one out away from completion, but his performance Sunday afternoon in Toronto was one of this season's best pitched games -- even better than most of the season's no-nos.

 

Morrow attained a level of dominance from start to finish that exceeded all but the Phillies' Roy Halladay in 2010. He struck out 17 Rays and allowed only four baserunners: two walks, one error and the one hit, a groundball single by Evan Longoria that caromed off the glove of diving second baseman Aaron Hill. It was a clean base hit that would have required a highlight-reel defensive stop to be prevented, but it wasn't an impossible play.

 

Morrow, who turned 26 two weeks ago, pounded the strike zone with a fastabll that averaged 93 mph for the game, and reached a high of 97 in the second inning, but it was his success throwing his slider for strikes. According to Pitch F/x data, he threw 38 sliders and two curves, and 31 of those 40 breaking balls (77.5 percent) were strikes.

 

His stuff was brilliant all day. For the first out of the eighth inning, for instance, Morrow snapped such an impressive full-count curve ball that the Rays' John Jaso -- who has such notable plate discipline that, though a catcher, he bats leadoff -- simply marched back to the visiting dugout, even though the pitch was up in the zone and only a borderline strike. By not arguing or even waiting for the home-plate umpire's call before returning to the bench, Jaso was conceding that the pitch was unhittable.

 

One can only wonder what would have happened if first baseman Lyle Overbay hadn't botched a routine Dan Johnson groundball in the seventh inning. Morrow struck out the next batter, Matt Joyce, on three pitches, but the Rays' lineup cycled one more spot, allowing Longoria to bat in the ninth.

 

His final stat line was reminiscent to the greatest pitching performance of Pedro Martinez's career. Pitching against the Yankees as a Red Sox on Sept. 10, 1999, Martinez threw his own 17-strikeout one-hitter. Martinez didn't walk any batters, unlike Morrow, but the hit he allowed was a solo homer to Chili Davis, killing his shutout.

 

Morrow has always had the talent for such a performance and, in fact, had thrown two other one-hitters of more than seven innings. The Mariners made him the No. 5 pick of the 2006 draft, though he's had an erratic career shifting from bullpen to rotation and back. He debuted as a reliever in 2007, but in his first career start on Sept. 5, 2008, he allowed just one hit to the Yankees over 7 2/3 innings, giving up one run and striking out eight.

 

Anointed Seattle's closer for 2009, he ran into trouble in May and lost the job. He later returned to the rotation where he had mild success highlighted by his final start of the year in which he again gave up just one hit, this time while shutting out the A's over eight innings with nine strikeouts. The Mariners shipped Morrow to Toronto for reliever Brandon League after the season.

 

The Blue Jays made Morrow a full-time starter for the first time in his career. After his gem on Sunday, his record was 9-6 and his ERA was down to 4.45, but even after pitching the game of his life, he didn't look happy. While giving a postgame interview to Rogers SportsNet, his face wore an expression of disappointment, even before he fell victim to a celebratory Gatorade shower and two shaving-cream pie attacks.

 

Though a sports almanac won't list Morrow among the no-hitters of 2010, he can rest easy knowing he outpitched everyone in this Year of the Pitcher -- except Halladay.

 

The Best Pitching Performances of the 2010 Season

1. Halladay, Phillies; May 29 at Marlins9 IP, 0 hits, 0 runs, 11 strikeouts, 0 walks, 98 game score

 

Halladay cruised through Florida's lineup, striking out 11 over 115 pitches in a two-hour, 13-minute game in which the losing pitcher, Josh Johnson, allowed only one unearned run in seven innings. No great defensive plays were needed to support Halladay, just a few above-average ones.

 

 

2. Morrow, Blue Jays; Aug. 8 vs. Rays
9 IP, 1 hit, 0 runs, 17 strikeouts, 2 walks, 100 game score

 

His volume of strikeouts and prowess with the slider -- both its bite and regularity in the zone -- give Morrow's performance the boost. He needed 137 pitches but 97 of them were strikes, including 25 called strikes, 20 swinging strikes and 41 foul balls, the latter an indication that the Rays struggled to square him up. Tampa Bay's Ben Zobrist did manage one hard-hit ball, which Toronto centerfielder Vernon Wells tracked down for a great catch against the wall. Morrow's outing was the season's first game score of at least 100, according to the Bill James-created metric of performance.

 

 

3. Dallas Braden, A's; May 9 vs. Rays9 IP, 0 hits, 0 runs, 6 strikeouts, 0 walks, 93 game score

 

If ever there were a yeoman perfect game, this was it. Braden induced 21 outs in the field of play -- seven grounders, 14 flyouts -- to go along with his six strikeouts over 109 pitches. Only five times all game did Braden get the Rays to swing and miss. Third baseman Kevin Kouzmanoff made a couple nice plays to range for popups, and leftfielder Eric Patterson snared two hard-hit liners.

 

 

4. Armando Galarraga, Tigers; June 2 vs. Indians
9 IP, 1 hit*, 0 runs, 3 strikeouts, 0 walks, 88 game score

 

The asterisked perfect game was extraordinarily efficient, though not exactly dominant. Because of the now infamous blown call by first-base umpire Jim Joyce, Galarraga did allow one baserunner on one of the most dubious infield singles in the sport's history. But he pounded the strike zone, with first-pitch strikes to 24 of 28 hitters, and got 14 groundouts. He didn't miss many bats, however, striking out only three and getting only five swing-and-miss strikes.

 

 

5. Matt Garza, Rays; July 26 vs. Tigers
9 IP, 0 hits, 0 runs, 6 strikeouts, 1 walk, 92 game score

 

Garza allowed just one walk in his no-hitter, a free pass to Detroit's Brennan Boesch in the second, and he was wiped out in a double play, allowing Garza to face the minimum 27 batters. He struck out only six and needed a host of good defensive plays. Even Garza admitted after the game that his mechanics felt off, and so he relied heavily on his fastball, throwing it for 101 of his 120 pitches.

 

 

6. Travis Wood, Reds; July 10 vs. Phillies
9 IP, 1 hit, 0 runs, 8 strikeouts, 0 walks, 93 game score

 

Wood carried a perfect game into the ninth, when he allowed a double to Phillies catcher Carlos Ruiz, the only baserunner he gave up in nine innings. Wood struck out eight, but because Halladay also threw nine shutout innings, he got a no-decision, and the Reds lost the game in the 11th. Wood threw only 19 pitches from behind in the count, and the majority of those (11) came when he was down only 1-0.

 

 

7. Ubaldo Jimenez, Rockies; April 17 vs. Braves
9 IP, 0 hits, 0 runs, 7 strikeouts, 6 walks, 88 game score

 

From the sixth inning on, Jimenez's no-hitter was as good as any of the perfect games. It was in that frame that he began pitching out of the stretch full-time, because of his wildness from the windup that led to six walks in the first five innings. Jimenez retired the final 12 Braves in order, however, and and finished with seven strikeouts and 128 pitches.

 

 

8. Matt Cain, Giants; May 28 vs. Diamondbacks

9 IP, 1 hit, 0 runs, 9 strikeouts, 0 walks, 94 game score

 

Cain threw a 122-pitch one-hitter, and the one hit -- a double by Arizona's Mark Reynolds -- was nearly caught by rightfielder Nate Schierholtz, who just missed making a leaping catch at the warning track. Cain did hit one batter with a pitch (also Reynolds) while striking out nine and throwing 122 pitches.

 

 

9. Johnny Cueto, Reds; May 11 at Pirates
9 IP, 1 hit, 0 runs, 8 strikeouts, 0 walks, 93 game score

 

Cueto's day was eerily similar to Cain's, as Cueto allowed two baserunners -- also via one hit and one hit batsman to the same guy, in this case Pittsburgh's Ronny Cedeno -- to go along with eight strikeouts. And the hit Cueto yielded was also very nearly an out, as shortstop Paul Janish nearly fielded the groundball deep in the hole. Cueto was highly efficient, in needing just 102 pitches.

 

 

10. Edwin Jackson, Diamondbacks; June 25 vs. Rays
9 IP, 0 hits, 0 runs, 6 strikeouts, 8 walks, 85 game score

 

Jackson, who has since been traded to the White Sox, had about the most unsightly stat line possible for a no-hitter, as he walked eight Rays and hit a ninth. With all those baserunners and deep counts, he needed 149 pitches to go the distance and threw nearly as many balls (70) as strikes (79). So taxing was the performance that he was given an extra two days off before his next start and wasn't very good in his next five starts, going 1-4 with a 7.24 ERA.



Read more: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/joe_lemire/08/08/morrow/index.html?eref=sircrc#ixzz0w6vtX3je

 

브랜든 머로우 17K 1히터 완봉

Morrow's one-hitter

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Longoria ends no-no

 

 

 

 

 

 

Morrow gets an early shower

 

 

 

 

 


 

2010년 8월 8일 일요일

What If We Are Wrong Again About Steroids?

What If We Are Wrong Again About Steroids?

 

 

A research project argues that the home run feats of Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire may not have been

the result of steroid use, an opinion that may force many to re-examine the home run era again. (AP)

 

 

So I read the main story, and I read the expansive supporting material, and I read some of the work again, and here are the six words that keep playing in my mind: “Oh no, we’re doing it again.” It probably will take a little while for me to explain what I mean.

 

Let’s start at the start, with one of the hottest non-Brett Favre sports things on the Internet … Eric Walker’s expansive project he titled: Steroids, Other “Drugs,” and Baseball. No, it’s not the flashiest title in the world. But it’s striking reading. I’m going to give you a too-quick rundown of the work here for discussion purposes, but I would really recommend that, if you care at all about steroids, other drugs and baseball, you read Eric’s work for yourself. It’s persuasive, difficult, provocative and, yes, a bit angry. You (if you hold certain opinions) might find yourself feeling like the author is sticking his finger in your face and calling you a dolt. That’s the one unfortunate part of the writing, I think … but it comes from passion and I would hope you can move past it and read through and judge the interesting conclusions on their merit.

 

The main story — and the supporting material — is Eric Walker’s effort to try to bring some facts, some science and some cold logic to the steroid issue. It’s a worthwhile effort because one thing that is undeniable is that much of the steroid discussion you hear is overwhelmed by hysteria and moralizing and preconceived notions and pseudo science. Seems to me that nothing — nothing at all — about this steroid story is “obvious” and yet people talk about it in “obvious” ways all the time. Walker takes a baseball bat to it all.

 

The first thing Walker does is repeat the four logical reasons why steroid use in baseball is wrong in the first place. Apparently these four reasons have been more or less agreed upon among the various ethical philosophers who have studied the issue … and the reasons sound right to me. I would summarize the reasons like so:

 

1. Steroids are extremely dangerous tor your health and, in fact, can kill you.
2. Steroids help players hit more home runs and do other unnatural things.
3. Other players see steroid use and feel trapped, like they have no choice but to join in.
4. Kids see it all and want to do steroids themselves.

 

Maybe you can think of another reason steroids are wrong, but those four seem to cover just about everything … and the four (as Walker points out) are intertwined. To believe (3) and (4) you must believe (1) and (2). You could, in fact, argue that the only TRUE reasons we believe steroids are wrong in baseball is that they’re bad for you (and, thus, illegal) and they make players unnaturally good at baseball (and thus are cheating).

 

Again, you should read Walker’s conclusions for yourself. But since we’re trying to get to the main point, I’ll summarize Walker’s conclusions (as I understand them):

 

1. Walker contends steroids are not nearly as bad for responsible adults as people say and are significantly less dangerous than countless other things athletes do as a matter of course (he does say that steroids are extremely dangerous for adolescents).
2. Walker contends steroids do not help players hit more home runs.
3. Walker contends that other players are coerced to do MANY semi-dangerous and vaguely unnatural things to play high level sports … this is the price of playing sports at the highest level.
4. Walker contends kids absolutely do not take steroids because pro athletes do it.

 

Now, these conclusions are harsh and counterintuitive and against just about everything you’ve no doubt read and heard … and for the points of this essay I’m not here to say how much I agree or disagree. Walker makes his points openly, using many sources and studies and charts, and it seems to me that these opinions have simply not been given fair view in the open marketplace. For our purposes, the most interesting conclusion is No. 2 — his conclusion that steroids does not help hitters hit home runs — so we’ll spend our time on that one. But before moving on, I should probably point out that when it comes to those other three things, many people who have studied the issue closely agree. Here are Walker quotes on those subjects:

 

On health: “In sum, there are medical risks, but of nothing remotely like the variety or severity commonly suggested. In reality, they are unlikely, usually minor, and almost universally reversible.”

 

On coercion: “Each player does what he thinks is necessary to achieve and maintain the level of performance that he finds proper. There is no logical or ethical distinction between — just for example — killer workouts and PEDs. Each is what that athlete finds appropriate or necessary.”

 

On athlete role models: “Adolescents by and large do not have pro-athlete role models; in one extensive study, only 18% reported an athlete as a role model — and those so reporting were, as substance abuse goes, slightly cleaner than the rest.

 

OK, but, you want to talk home runs. Well, we all know what we all know … there were a lot of home runs hit in Major League Baseball in the years after the strike to 2006 or so. Per game, home runs spiked from .89 in 1993 to 1.03 in 1994 to a peak of 1.17 in 2000. And we all know about the rather remarkable (and even unbelievable) individual home run numbers — Brady Anderson suddenly hitting 50, Sosa and McGwire hitting all those home runs in 1998 and beyond, the Barry Bonds saga. From 1901-1993 only 11 different players hit 50-plus home runs. From 1994-2010, 14 different players did it.

 

But, even the angriest fans and critics must admit that many things can cause a home run spike. Many things HAVE caused giant home runs spikes. The greatest home run spike in baseball history happened from 1918 to 1921 — total homers jumped from 235 to 447 to 630 to 937. Why? There are various theories (outlawing of the spitball, a more regular rotation of baseballs, various scorekeeping changes*) but the overriding feeling is that Major League Baseball spiked the ball (so much so that it was regularly called “The Jackrabbit Ball,” and the era before is still called “Dead Ball”) . MLB denied any change in the ball, of course, but MLB always denies stuff like that … we know that the game was in pretty dire straits after the 1919 World Series and again after Ray Chapman was killed by pitch in 1920. Home runs — many of them hit by Babe Ruth — were good for baseball. Babe Ruth, it is still said, saved the game.

 

*Also, not well known, baseball did try to ban the intentional walk in 1920.

 

The point here, though, is that if a simple adjustment in the design of a baseball could cause home runs to QUADRUPLE in four years (and this was in 1920, when our knowledge of physics was probably not quite as advanced) then we have to concede that the people running the game have long had the power to change the game of baseball.* Whether they used that power is debatable … but they have HAD the power. After all, the number of players who hit 30-plus home runs from 1900 to 1919 was zero, but the number from 1920-1930 was 19.

 

*This seems a good time to again pull out a quote from one of my most quoted movies: “Quiz Show.” This was Martin Scorsese (as president of Geritol) saying that they didn’t need to fix the quiz shows: “Why fix them? Think about it, will ya? You could do exactly the same thing by just making the questions easier.”

 

And 1920 is not the only time that we’ve had rather stunning power surges. There was another massive homer jump between 1976 to 1977 … there were two expansion teams added in 1977, which was the conventional explanation for the jump. But expansion could not have made the difference between the 2,235 total home runs hit in 1976 and the 3,644 home runs hit in 1977. In 1976, four players hit 30-plus home runs, Mike Schmidt led all of baseball with 38, Graig Nettles led the American League with 32. In 1977, 19 different players hit 30-plus home runs and George Foster famously hit 52.

 

Why? Again, Walker suggests (convincingly) that it was the ball. MLB switched from a Rawlings ball to a Spalding ball before that season.

 

You no doubt remember the next mega-jump — that was 1987. There were 3,813 home runs hit in 1986 and there were 4,458 home runs hit in 1987. Nobody hit more than Jesse Barfield’s 40 home runs in 1986 and that year 13 players hit 30-plus homers. In 1987, four players hit 44-plus home runs and an amazing 28 players hit 30-plus homers. Those 28 players were a record — it SMASHED the previous record set, yep, in 1977.

 

Why did it happen in 1987? Still, nobody knows. But the best guess has long been that the ball was juiced.

 

So, you can see that baseball, willingly or unwillingly, has ALWAYS had the ability to send home run numbers skyrocketing. I’m not saying that there are baseball wizards behind curtains cackling to themselves as they inject homer juice into the baseballs (though I DO think that was probably the case in 1920). No, I’m saying that baseball gurus have always had the power to stealthily alter the game. One tiny switch … that’s all it takes.

 

The biggest power jump in the steroid era did not happen in the late 1990s as most of us think but actually from 1993 to 1994. There were 4030 home runs hit in 1993 … and the players were on pace to hit almost 4,700 homers in 1994 before the strike crushed the season. That was a huge spike year. You will no doubt remember the individual achievements. Matt Williams was just about on pace that year to break Roger Maris’ home run record when the strike struck, and Ken Griffey Jr. had a shot at the record, and Tony Gwynn was a real threat to hit .400 (just to show it wasn’t all power that year). Jeff Bagwell and Frank Thomas were both having absurd Jimmie Foxx kinds of years AND (people do forget this), Barry Bonds had 37 home runs in 112 games. He was on pace to hit 53 or so home runs. And this was the SKINNY Bonds (he might, with a stolen base rush, have had a shot at a 50-50 season). Seventeen different players (including a 25-year-old kid named Sammy Sosa) had at least a shot at 40 home runs … the most ever in a season had been eight.

 

So what happened from 1993 to 1994? Steroids kicking in? It doesn’t seem likely that all of a sudden all these players, all at once, started doing steroids at exactly the same time and their power numbers began to soar all at the same time. It seems much more likely that, yep, once again, something happened to the baseball.

 

This starts to get to the point here, which is this: We KNOW that adjustments to the baseball — adjustments so slight that baseball can deny they even exist — can create a massive shift in the game. We KNOW that slight alterations to the rules (such as expanding or shrinking the strike zone a touch or raising/lowering the mound) can create a massive shift in the statistics of the game. We KNOW that even minute changes in ballpark dimensions can create massive shifts as well*.

 

*Kauffman Stadium in 2002 was the easiest park in the American League to hit a home run. The fences were moved back just 10 feet. In 2004, Kauffman Stadium was the hardest park in the American League to hit a home run.

 

We KNOW these things are true. But we don’t KNOW what steroids do to help players hit home runs. It’s like Jim Mora said: We may THINK we know but really don’t know. For a long time, you will remember, the conventional wisdom was that weight training and steroid use could NOT help you hit home runs — could not give you the necessary hand-eye coordination, the necessary form, the necessary mental approach, the necessary preparation and so on. And then, one day, without any real shift in logic except that a few guys started hitting a lot of home runs, the conventional wisdom shifted wildly to the point where it seemed that steroid use was the MAIN FACTOR in home run hitting.

 

Eric Walker says it isn’t true. First of all, he says that if you remove the spikes caused by changes in the baseball — the 1977 change, the 1993-94 change — that true power has actually been declining since 1962 and has been at a constant the last 20 years or so (with the exception of the 1987 jump). The initial reaction is the call bull on it … but why? We know that changes in the baseball can cause home run flurries. We’ve known it for 90 years. But we don’t KNOW that steroids can cause home run flurries … we just assume it.

 

And Walker says it’s a bad assumption. He points out that steroids “very heavily favor” building your upper body while home run power mostly comes from lower body strength. He suggests that if Barry Bonds added 20 pounds of pure muscle to his whole body, probably no more than 5 or 7 of those pounds would be lower body, and by his math equation the added power would likely be no more than 2 to 4 feet of length. He points out that while the players may have looked bigger and stronger — and no doubt WERE bigger and stronger — it certainly was not the cause of the home run records.

 

With everything that has been said about steroids the last 10 or so years, I don’t expect you to just suddenly believe that steroids didn’t make any difference … you should read his entire piece and decide what you think. But one thing you might think is: “If steroids don’t make any difference, then why would players cheat and do them?” But there actually is precedent for ineffective cheating in baseball. For years, hitters thought they were cheating the game when they corked their bats. Even in the last couple of months, there has been a lot of talk about Pete Rose and whether or not he corked his bats. But study after study has shown that corked bats don’t make a damned bit of difference (or, if anything, cause the ball to be hit less solidly) … players may have THOUGHT they were cheating the game, and maybe the added confidence of having a corked bat helped them hit better than as some sort of baseball placebo effect. Or maybe not. Either way, hitters kept corking bats in some sort of vague attempt to cheat the game.

 

Anyway, it’s a whole lot to think about … but we SHOULD think about it rather than just blindly continue our hysterical “Let’s not vote for anybody in the Hall of Fame … these guys ruined baseball … the baseball world is crashing” talk. Nobody really LIKES that steroids infected the game, and nobody LIKES how it was handled, but that doesn’t mean we haven’t all wildly overreacted to what may have been a much smaller effect than people have simply assumed.

 

And that takes us all the way back to the beginning of this post. One thing sportswriters have done is beat ourselves up for the way we handled the 1998 home run chase. And people outside of baseball have beaten us up over it too. We celebrated Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa. We celebrated the home run. We celebrated baseball. It was so much fun. A good friend of mine just told me that she cried in joy the day McGwire hit his 62nd home run. It was like that.

 

Only, then, the steroid news started to emerge, and a pumped up Barry Bonds (who nobody wanted to celebrate for too many reasons to go into here) started to hit the home runs, and Hank Aaron’s record fell and suddenly we felt cheated. Why did we allow ourselves to get pulled in? This was fake! We should have known! We were duped! And we could not allow ourselves to be duped, so we came back, harsher and harsher, more and more convinced that none of what we saw was real. When Mark McGwire came out to admit his steroid use and apologize for what he did (all so he could come back and be a hitting coach in the game he clearly loves) he was crushed from all sides because he was unwilling to concede that the home runs he hit were fake.

 

And after reading Eric Walker’s work, those six words repeated: “Oh no, we’re doing it again.” What if McGwire was right? What if we find out that Walker’s conclusions — and the conclusions of many people who have studied the steroid issue — are right? What if we find out that steroids were NOT the cause of the home runs, not even a little bit? What if we find out that the home runs were the cause of a livelier ball and a smaller strike zone and harder bats and the willingness of players to swing hard even if it means striking out and smaller ballparks and pitch counts? People will say “Well, then why have home runs gone down again? It’s obvious that it is because of steroid testing and the game is finally clean again and …” but there we go, making assumptions again.

 

What if we are wrong again? What if we find that all the angry articles we’ve written about how steroids will make you a great home run hitter are wrong (articles were no doubt read by children wanting to be home run hitters)? What if we find that the home run spike in the late 1990s were not because of steroids but instead largely because of a helium baseball that was put in to get people to forget about the strike? It’s a worthwhile question: Will we beat ourselves up again 10 years from now?

 

 

http://joeposnanski.si.com/2010/08/06/what-if-we-are-wrong-again-about-steroids/

 

 

600홈런과 숫자들...

Alex Rodriguez and the 600 Home Run Club, by the numbers


 

It took him awhile, but on Wednesday afternoon, Alex Rodriguez became just the seventh man in baseball history to hit 600 home runs. A-Rod is the youngest to reach the mark by a year and a half, and the first non-outfielder to accomplish the feat. The milestone home run came with a 2-0 count and one man on base against Blue Jays righty Shaun Marcum in the bottom of the first inning of a scoreless game. Here is a breakdown of all 600 of his home runs as well as a look at how Rodriguez stacks up against the other members of the 600 club.

Who

Most victimized teams: Angels (67), Orioles (51), Blue Jays (51), Twins (45), Red Sox (45)

Most victimized pitchers: Bartolo Colon (8), Ramon Ortiz (8), David Wells (8), Tim Wakefield (7), Jarrod Washburn (7)

Members of 300-Win Club: Roger Clemens (2), Tom Glavine (1)

Cy Young award winners: Bartolo Colon (8), Barry Zito (5), Chris Carpenter (3), Clemens (2), Doug Drabek (2), Cliff Lee (2), Johan Santana (2), Glavine (1), Dwight Gooden (1), Zack Greinke (1), Roy Halladay (1), Orel Hershiser (1), Pedro Martinez (1), Jack McDowell (1), Jake Peavy (1)

Cy Young award winners in their Cy Young seasons: Colon, 2005 (4); Martinez, 1999 (1)

Brothers: Jered (4) and Jeff Weaver (1); Orlando (4) and Livan Hernandez (3)

Righties: 454 (16.6 PA/HR)

Lefties: 146 (17.0 PA/HR)

What

First: off Tom Gordon, Royals, June 12, 1995, two-out solo homer in the fourth inning at the Kingdome with Mariners trailing 8-3

By runs: Solo (310), two-run (206), three-run (63), grand slams (21)*

By game situation: go-ahead (204), game-tying (48), walk-off (9)

Multi-homer games: two homers (52), three homers (3)

*Rodriguez is tied with Manny Ramirez for second all-time in grand slams. Lou Gehrig leads with 23.

When

Season highs: 57 (2002), 54 (2007), 52 (2001), 48 (2005), 47 (2003)

Postseason: ALCS (7), ALDS (5), World Series (1)

All-Star Game: 1 (Coors Field, 1998)

Month (regular season): August (122), July (106), May (104), September/October (95), March/April (87), June (86)

Inning: First (110), Sixth (89), Third (78), Seventh (63), Fourth (59), Eighth (59), Fifth (58), Second (39), Ninth (36), Eleventh (3), Tenth (2), Twelfth (2), Fifteenth (1), Sixteenth (1)

By position: Shortstop (344)*, Third Base (245), Designated Hitter (11)

By position in the batting order: Third (223), Fourth (217), Second (118), Fifth (32), Ninth (6), First (2), Seventh (1), Sixth (1)

Count: 0-0 (104), 0-1 (70), 1-0 (62), 1-1 (61), 3-2 (55), 2-2 (51), 2-1 (49), 1-2 (43), 2-0 (41), 3-1 (38), 0-2 (21), 3-0 (2), unknown (3)

Runners on base: Bases empty (310); First base occupied (220); Men on, but first base empty (70)

Run differential: Tied (169), +/-1 (134), +/-2 (76), +/-3 (79), +/-4 or more (142)

*Rodriguez moved to third base one home run shy of Cal Ripken Jr.'s record for home runs as a shortstop.

Where

Ballparks: Yankee Stadium (124), Ballpark in Arlington (96), Kingdome (60), Safeco Field (39), Angel Stadium (37)

Cities: New York (155), Seattle (99), Arlington (96), Anaheim (37), Toronto (32)

Inactive Parks: Yankee Stadium (124), Kingdome (60), Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome (21), Tiger Stadium (6), Milwaukee County Stadium (3), Shea Stadium (2), Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium (1), 3Com Park at Candlestick Point (1), Jack Murphy/Qualcomm Stadium (1),

Parks in which he has played but not homered (by PA, active parks in italics): Wrigley Field (15), Busch Stadium II (14), Citizens Bank Park (14)*, Target Field (12), Estadio Hiram Bithorn (11), Tokyo Dome (9), Land Shark Stadium (5)

*Rodriguez did homer in Citizens Bank Park in Game 3 of the 2009 World Series

600-home run club

Statistics through each players' first 600 home runs only (NOTE: All-Star Game and postseason home runs do not count toward a player's career totals):

Career home-run leaders: Barry Bonds (762), Hank Aaron (755), Babe Ruth (714), Willie Mays (660), Ken Griffey Jr. (630), Sammy Sosa (609), Alex Rodriguez (600)

Age at 600th: Rodriguez (35 years, 8 days), Ruth (36 years, 196 days), Aaron (37 years, 81 days), Bonds (38 years, 16 days), Mays (38 years, 139 days), Griffey Jr. (38 years, 202 days), Sosa (38 years, 221 days)

PA between 599 and 600: Rodriguez (51), Griffey Jr. (27), Mays (23), Sosa (13), Bonds (13), Aaron (1), Ruth (1)

PA/HR: Sosa (16.2), Rodriguez (16.7), Bonds (17.0), Griffey Jr. (17.4), Mays (18.0), Aaron (18.6)

AB/HR: Bonds (13.7), Sosa (14.40) Rodriguez (14.43), Griffey Jr. (15.1), Mays (15.9), Aaron (16.7)

HR as a percentage of hits: Sosa (25.4 percent), Bonds (24.9), Griffey Jr. (22.9), Rodriguez (22.8), Mays (20.5), Aaron (19.2)

Grand Slams in first 600 homers: Rodriguez (21), Griffey Jr. (15), Ruth (14), Aaron (13), Bonds (11), Sosa (9), Mays (7)

Walk-offs: Ruth (11), Sosa (10), Rodriguez (9), Bonds (6), Mays (5), Aaron (4), Griffey Jr. (4)

Pinch-hit homers: Mays (5)*, Griffey Jr. (5), Bonds (3), Aaron (2), Ruth (1), Sosa (1), Rodriguez (0)

Inside-the-park: Ruth (10), Mays (6), Bonds (3), Griffey Jr. (3), Sosa (2), Aaron (1), Rodriguez (0)

All-Star Game: Mays (3), Aaron (2), Bonds (2), Ruth (1)**, Griffey Jr. (1), Rodriguez (1), Sosa (0)

Postseason: Ruth (15), Rodriguez (13), Bonds (9), Aaron (6), Griffey Jr. (6), Sosa (2), Mays (1)

World Series: Ruth (15), Bonds (4), Aaron (3), Rodriguez (1), Mays (0), Griffey Jr. (0), Sosa (0)

*Mays' 600th home run was a pinch-hit homer. Mays hit for rookie George Foster with the game tied 2-2 in the seventh and hit a two-run homer that provided the winning margin for the Giants. **Ruth hit the first ever All-Star Game home run, in 1933.



Read more: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/cliff_corcoran/08/04/600.club/index.html#ixzz0w0nU1tzz